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Abstract—Spectrum reservation is emerging as one of the
potential solutions to cater for the communication needs of
massive number of wireless Internet of Things (IoT) devices with
reliability constraints particularly in mission-critical scenarios. In
most mission-critical systems, the true utility of a reservation may
not be completely known ahead of time as the unforseen events
might not be completely predictable. In this paper, we present a
dynamic contract approach where an advance payment is made
at the time of reservation based on partial information about
spectrum reservation utility. Once the complete information is
obtained, a rebate on the payment is made if the reservation
is released. In this paper, we present a contract theoretic
approach to design an incentivized mechanism that coerces the
applications to reveal their true application type resulting in
greater profitability of the IoT network operator. The operator
offers a menu of contracts with advanced payments and rebate to
the IoT applications without having knowledge about the types
of applications. The decision of the applications in selecting a
contract leads to a revelation of their true type to the operator
which allows it to generate higher profits than a traditional
spectrum auction mechanism. Under some assumptions on distri-
bution of the utility of the applications, closed form solutions for
the optimal dynamic spectrum reservation contract are provided
and the sensitivity against system parameters is analyzed.
Index Terms—Internet of things, mission-critical, ultra narrow
band, contract, information asymmetry, sequential screening.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) is foreseen to revolutionize
the operations, management, and control of electronic sys-
tems around us. Most existing IoT devices utilize traditional
wireless personal area network (WPAN) communication tech-
nologies [1] such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, etc., which
are inherently short-range privately administered networks.
However, the current focus of network operators is towards
developing low-power wide-area network (LPWA) technolo-
gies [2] dedicated for IoT communication for providing reli-
able communication and services for large scale IoT systems in
smart cities along the same lines as the cellular data networks.
Due to a predicted massive surge in the number of IoT
devices in the future owing to widespread adoption of the
technology [3], [4], there will be an acute shortage of wireless
spectrum for dedicated allocation to these systems. This will
pose a challenge to the mission-critical (MC) IoT systems [5]
such as in public safety systems or other emergency net-
works [6] requiring dedicated spectrum availability at all
times due to the unpredictability of unforseen events. The
MC applications [7] may be highly delay-sensitive, e.g., real
time systems involving artificial intelligence (AI), virtual and
Fig. 1: A spectrum reservation based UNB-IoT system where
the IoT devices only communicate with the AP during the
designated time-frequency blocks. The AP offers a dynamic
contract with advance payment and rebate amounts to the
devices and maintains a spectrum reservation chart for a fixed
time period.
augmented reality (VR/AR), real-time control loops, streaming
analytics, etc. Such applications are termed as MC not only
due to the link with life-threatening situations but also due
to a substantial risk of malfunction, services interruption,
and enterprise operation jeopardy resulting in damages and
losses to property, individuals, or businesses, etc. In MC
applications, often a delay in communication may in fact
fail the initial objective of the application. For instance, in
a surveillance system where an unusual activity needs to be
reported promptly to successfully avoid any potential damage
or loss of property and a report beyond a certain delay may
be futile.
The spectrum requirements for massive IoT networks [8]
will exceed the capacity of the unlicensed spectrum bands.
Therefore, exploring the sub-GHz spectrum and opportunis-
tically accessing whitespaces in existing licensed spectrum
bands will be inevitable to cater for the massive wireless
connectivity demand. Several traditional approaches have been
developed for mitigating this issue such as new MAC layer
schemes [9] to improve the efficiency of multiple access as
well as cognitive radio technologies (CRN) [10] for oppor-
tunistically accessing licensed spectra. One of the candidate
LPWA technologies that has emerged recently is known as
ultra narrow band (UNB) [11] which uses the random fre-
quency and time multiple access (RFTMA) [12] at the MAC
layer in which each user selects a time and frequency randomly
for transmission. Although it can improve the capacity of the
system, however, there is no performance and reliability guar-
antees which may be crucial for mission critical applications.
Spectrum reservation is an essential approach to provide
guarantees for MC applications. It has been shown that
reservation of spectrum leads to efficiency and reliability
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Fig. 2: Stages of spectrum reservation contract. In the first
stage, the applications privately obtain a probability distri-
bution over their utility of the spectrum reservation based
on which they opt for one of the contracts by the operator.
Once the true utility of the reserved spectrum is known, the
applications either hold the spectrum or release it for the
agreed rebate amount.
of communication which is particularly useful in MC and
emergency applications [13]. However, the implementation of
spectrum reservation needs to be appropriately incentivized for
it to be used in practice. Most works in literature dealing with
spectrum reservation are focused mainly on the protocol design
aspects such as [14], [15]. Those that deal with the economic
perspectives only investigate static contracts to establish the
quantity and price of spectrum to be reserved which as-
sume perfect knowledge of the application requirements [16].
However, in most practical situations particularly emergency
networks, the need for spectrum access cannot be perfectly
known ahead of time. If the spectrum has not been reserved a
priori, then the application may have to contend for channel
access resulting in significant delays in the communication
which might be costly in MC and emergency scenarios. One
of the solutions to this problem is that the network operators
offer dynamic contracts to applications whereby an advanced
payment is made earlier to reserve the spectrum in the form of
a time-frequency (TF) block for future use. However, prior to
actually using the spectrum, the application may request for
a rebate and release the reserved spectrum for use by other
applications. Such dynamic contracts can foresee the risks and
uncertainties in the future and reduce them through reservation
and prioritization.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic mechanism for spec-
trum reservation considering the uncertainty in available spec-
trum at each time and the uncertainty in the requirement
for spectrum access. We make use of tools from sequential
screening [17] and mechanism design literature to establish
a dynamic menu of contracts which comprises of an ad-
vanced payment for spectrum reservation in the future along
with a rebate policy if the spectrum is released before the
time of spectrum access. This allows the network operator
to discriminate the unknown application types and generate
higher profits than the traditional auction mechanisms where
every application is completely aware of its true utility. We
assume a two-type categorization of IoT applications where
they are either classified as MC or non-MC and consequently
an optimal binary contract is designed by the service provider.
Based on assumptions on the distribution of utility of the MC
Fig. 3: Available spectrum divided into time-frequency blocks
for reservation. The shaded regions indicate blocks occupied
by the primary user.
and non-MC applications, closed form results for the optimal
contracts are derived and the effect of system parameters is
analyzed to gain insights.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first describe the network model compris-
ing of details regarding the availability and cost of obtaining
an idle TF block. Then, a description of utility achieved
by applications from reserving the spectrum in advance is
discussed.
A. Network Model
We assume that a single IoT operator is coordinating the
communication between low power IoT devices using UNB
transmissions. We consider a single access point (AP) serving
a wide area network of IoT devices. The AP reserves TF
blocks in the available whitespace in existing licensed spectra
for a fixed duration T in the future. Let nt denote the
number of available channels of equal bandwidth β at time
t. An illustration of the spectrum resources available to the
AP for the duration T is provided in Fig. 3. At each time
t = 1, . . . , T , a random number of channels is available due
to the uncontrolled activity of the primary users in licensed
bands. Let κt = g(nt), where g : Z+ → R, represents the
cost of obtaining a channel at time t that is related to the
number of available channels. We denote the time average of
the channel cost over the duration T by κ = 1T
∑T
t=1 κt.
The IoT applications are categorized into two broad types,
i.e., MC or non-MC. Let pic ∈ [0, 1] represent the proportion of
MC applications and pin = 1 − pic be the proportion of non-
MC IoT applications. The AP enforces a reservation based
access scheme in which the applications reserve TF blocks
for the duration T in advance. If before the time of channel
access, the application determines that the transmission is not
needed, it can release the TF block in advance and request for
a partial rebate on the initial payment1. Hence, this transaction
can be summarized into two stages. At the beginning of the
first stage, the applications privately make an assessment of
their transmission requirements in the future. Since emergency
1The payments can be realized in several ways such using credits where
each device has a fixed number of credits to use for spectrum access at the
beginning of the first stage.
situations and or other unforseen events cannot be completely
predicted, the applications obtain a probability distribution
over their utility of reserving the channel. At the end of the
first stage, the service provider and the applications enter
into a contract which includes an advance payment and a
rebate agreement. At the beginning of the second period, the
applications learn their true utility of the reserved spectrum.
If the utility is higher than the rebated amount in monetary
terms, the application holds the channel. Otherwise, it prefers
to release the channel and obtain a rebate at the end of the
second period.
For each time instant, t = 1, . . . , T , two contracts are
offered by the network operator based on the average cost
of obtaining an idle channel. The proportion of MC and non-
MC applications vary during each time slot due to the relative
frequency of transmissions of each type of application. For
instance, if a MC application has has to transmit at each
time slot, then the number of contending MC applications
will be the same for all time slots. Similarly, if the non-MC
applications have to transmit once after 10 time slots, then the
non-MC applications will only contribute in the proportion
once after every 10 time slots.
B. Utility of Spectrum Reservation
In the absence of spectrum reservation, the IoT devices
have to contend for spectrum access by employing a multiple
access protocol involving some randomness in which case,
the average delay in channel access or the average number of
transmission until successful message delivery is denoted by δ.
It is natural to associate the spectrum reservation utility of the
applications to the expected channel access delay experienced
if there was no reserved spectrum. The average access delay
is a function of the number of simultaneously transmitting de-
vices, their physical placement relative to other neighbouring
devices, and the multiple access protocol used. Assuming that
δ represents the waiting time until successful spectrum access,
we model it as an exponential random variable with mean 1λ .
Let the utility of an application for reserving a TF block in
the future be represented by Vχ = hχ(δ), χ ∈ {c, n} referring
to the MC and non-MC applications respectively. hχ(.) is a
transformation of the average delay into a monetary value. We
assume that the transformation h(.) does not change the distri-
bution of the delay except the mean and the variance. There-
fore, we can claim that Vχ is also exponentially distributed
with intensity 1λχ , χ ∈ {c,n}. Consequently, we can state that
fVχ(v) = λχe
−λχv and FVχ(v) = 1 − e−λχv . With a slight
abuse of notation, we will refer to these functions as simply
fχ(v) and Fχ(v), χ ∈ {c,n} in the sequel. Furthermore, we
assume that λc ≤ λn, which implies that the MC applications
have a higher utility of reserving the channel as compared to
the non-MC applications. This is a reasonable assumption as,
inherently, MC applications are more sensitive to the average
delay in spectrum access.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first describe the objective of the IoT
service provider and then provide a detailed description of the
methodology used to achieve the desired objective.
A. Objective
The objective of the IoT network operator is to create a
menu of contracts for the two main types of IoT applications
which allows it to coerce them into revealing their private in-
formation and using it to generate higher profits. The challenge
lies in the information asymmetry between the applications
and the service provider. The applications know more about
their utility of a TF block than the service provider. If the
service provider had information about the type of application
requesting the TF blocks, it can use price discrimination to
extract maximum profit by charging higher prices to MC
applications. However, in the absence of information about the
applications, the service provider has to design a mechanism
which results in the applications revealing their true types by
selecting the contract that suits them. This mechanism is in the
form of a refund contract where the applications learn their
utilities sequentially.
In summary, the objective of the operator is to optimally
design the advance payments and rebates for the MC and non-
MC applications represented by the tuple C = {pc, rc, pn, rn},
where pc and pn are the advance payments respectively at
the end of the first stage stage while rc and rn is the rebate
offered by the network operator in case the applications release
the reserved TF blocks at the end of the second stage. The
IoT applications will select one of the contracts and if the
mechanism is well designed, the applications will not have
any incentive to deviate from their true preferences. Hence, in
this process, they reveal their true types to the operator leading
to higher profitability.
B. Spectrum Reservation Contract
The contract is established at the end of the first stage while
only a probability distribution over the applications’ valuation
is known to them privately.
1) Operator Profitability: Given the contract tuple C =
{pc, rc, pn, rn}, the expected profit of the IoT network op-
erator can be expressed as follows:
Π(C) =
∑
χ∈{c,n}
piχ (pχ − rχFχ(rχ)− κ(1− Fχ(rχ))) ,
=
∑
χ∈{c,n}
piχ
(
pχ − rχ + e−λχrχ(rχ − κ)
)
. (1)
Note that pχ is the advance payment received by the network
operator, rχFχ(rχ) is the expected amount of rebate paid back
to the application, and κ(1− Fχ(rχ)) is the expected cost of
obtaining an idle channel by the operator. The expected profit
from both MC and non-MC applications are added after being
weighted by their proportions in the network.
2) IC & IR Constraints: In order for the spectrum reserva-
tion mechanism to be implementable, it has to be individually
rational (IR), i.e., both the MC and non-MC applications will
only participate in the spectrum reservation if at best on aver-
age, they do not receive a lower utility than the payment they
make. Note that at the end of the second stage, the application
will always prefer to release the channel in return for a rebate
if the amount refunded is greater that its actual utility of the
channel. Therefore, the expected return of the application can
be written as
∫∞
0
Rχ(v)fχ(v)dv, whereRχ(v) = max(rχ, v).
Hence, the expected utility of the application for reserving the
channel can be expressed as rχFχ(rχ) +
∫∞
rχ
xfX(x)dx and
the IR implies that it should be at least as much as the payment
made for reservation. This can be expressed as follows:
rχFχ(rχ) +
∫ ∞
rχ
xfX(x)dx ≥ pχ, χ ∈ {c, n}. (2)
Moreover, the mechanism also needs to be incentive compati-
ble (IC), i.e., there is no incentive for any type of application to
hide their true type from the operator by choosing a different
contract. In other words, the MC applications should be better
off choosing the MC contract and vice versa. For the two-
type case, this can be formally expressed by the following
two constraints:
rcFc(rc) +
∫ ∞
rc
νfc(ν)dν − pc ≥ rnFc(rn) +
∫ ∞
rn
νfc(ν)dν − pn,
(3)
rnFn(rn) +
∫ ∞
rn
νfn(ν)dν − pn ≥ rcFn(rc) +
∫ ∞
rc
νfn(ν)dν − pc,
(4)
The next step is combine these set of equations for the case
considered to write the optimal contracting problem.
3) Optimal Contracting Problem: The optimal contracting
problem can then be formally written as follows:
max
C
Π(C) =
∑
χ∈{c,n}
piχ
(
pχ − rχ + e−λχrχ(rχ − κ)
)
, (5)
subject to
(IRχ) rχ +
1
λχ
e−λχrχ ≥ pχ, χ = {c, n}, (6)
(ICc,n) rc +
e−λcrc
λc
− pc ≥ rn + e
−λcrn
λc
− pn, (7)
(ICn,c) rn +
e−λnrn
λn
− pn ≥ rc + e
−λnrc
λn
− pc. (8)
The solution to this problem results in the optimal contract C
that leads to the maximum profit for the network operator in
the scenario where the MC applications learn their utility of
channel reservation over time in multiple stages.
C. Solution to the Optimization Problem
Before we proceed towards the solution to the problem,
we first exploit the structure of the constraints to remove
the redundancies leading to a simplification of the original
problem. The special structure emerges due to the properties
of the exponentially distributed utilities of the applications. We
describe the notion of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD)
in the following definition.
Definition 1. The distribution of a random variable X ∈ X
first order stochastically dominates the distribution of a ran-
dom variable Y ∈ X if FX(x) ≤ FY (x),∀x ∈ X .
According to the definition, it is clear that the distribution
of utility of MC applications Fc(v) first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of non-MC applications Fn(v) since
λc ≤ λn. The implication of this property on the original
optimization problem described by eqs. (5) to (8) is provided
by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under the FSD of the distribution of utility
of MC applications, the constraints ICc,n, and IRn imply IRc.
Hence, the constraint IRc is redundant and can be removed
from the problem.
Proof. The constraints ICc,n and IRn are expressed as follows:
rc +
e−λcrc
λc
− pc ≥ rn + e
−λcrn
λc
− pn, (9)
rn +
1
λn
e−λnrn − pn ≥ 0. (10)
Since λc ≤ λn, so it clear that rn+ e−λcrnλc −pn ≥ rn+ 1λn e−λnrn−
pn ≥ 0. This in turn implies that rc + e−λcrcλc − pc ≥ 0, which
precisely describes the constraint IRc. Hence, we can remove
it from the original problem.
Furthermore, note that in the optimal contract, the constraint
IRn is binding, i.e., satisfied with equality. If it does not
bind, then increasing pχ, χ ∈ {c,n} equally can lead to an
increase in the profit of the IoT network operator. Similarly,
the constraint ICc,n also binds since otherwise increasing pc
can lead to an increase in profit. Therefore, we can substitute
the constraints IRn and ICc,n into the objective function and
ignore ICn,c to obtain a relaxed problem as follows:
max
rc,rn
e−λnrn
(
1
λn
+ pin(rn − κ)
)
− e−λcrn
(
pic
λc
)
+
pic
(
e−λcrc
(
1
λc
+ rc − κ
))
. (11)
Fortunately, the relaxed problem is separable in the decision
variables rc and rn. Hence, the optimal solution to the relaxed
problem can be expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the optimal contract offered to the IoT appli-
cations, the rebate to the MC applications that maximizes the
expected profit equals the average cost of the channel, i.e.,
r∗c = κ. The optimal rebate for the non-MC applications can
be obtained by solving the following fixed-point equation:
r∗n = κ+
pic(e
r∗n (λn−λc) − 1)
pinλn
(12)
Proof. Let J(rc) = pic
(
e−λcrc
(
1
λc
+ rc − κ
))
. Since
dJ(rc)
drc
= −λc(rc − κ), the optimal amount of rebate of-
fered to the MC applications r∗c = κ and it is indeed a
maximizer as d
2J(rc)
dr2c
= −λc < 0. Similarly, let H(rn) =
e−λnrn
(
pic+pin
λn
+ pin(rn − κ)
)
− e−λcrn
(
pic
λc
)
. Now, dH(rn)drn =
e−λnrn (−pic − λnpin(rn − κ)) + pice−λcrc . Setting this to zero
results in the fixed-point equation given by (12).
Lemma 2. A unique fixed-point solution exists for the optimal
rebate for non-MC applications given by (12) only if pic ≤
λn
2λn−λc and is expressed as follows:
r∗n = log
(
λnpin
pic(λn − λc)
)
. (13)
Proof. Let L(rn) = κ +
pic(e
rn(λn−λc)−1)
pinλn
. Since L(rn) is an
exponentially increasing function of rn, so a unique fixed-
point only exists if dL(r
∗
n )
drn
= 1. Solving this results in the
expression for optimal rebate for non-MC applications given
by the lemma. Furthermore, a valid solution only exists if
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Fig. 4: Effect of varying proportion of MC applications in the
network.
rn ≥ 0 which implies that λnpinpic(λn−λc) ≥ 1 resulting in the
condition provided for pic in the lemma.
Now, for optimality of r∗c and r
∗
n , it is sufficient to show that
the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies the ICn,c constraint
as well. Since the ICc,n constraints bind with equality, we know
that
pn − pc = rn − rc + e
−λcrn
λc
− e
−λcrc
λc
. (14)
In order for ICn,c constraint to be specified, we need to show
the following:
rn − rc − (pn − pc) + e
−λnrn
λn
− e
−λnrc
λn
≥ 0. (15)
Substituting (14) into (15) results in the following:
e−λnrn
λn
− e
−λnrc
λn
+
(
e−λcrc
λc
− e
−λcrn
λc
)
≥ 0, (16)
which can be shown to be true for r∗c = κ and r
∗
n given by
Lemma 2 using the Taylor series expansion. Once the optimal
rebates have been obtained, the optimal advance payment can
be obtained using the binding constraints IRn and ICc,n as
expressed by the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In the optimal contract offered to the IoT
applications, the advance payment for reserving a TF block
by MC and non-MC applications that maximizes the expected
profit of the operator can be obtained as follows:
p∗n = r
∗
n +
1
λn
e−λnr
∗
n , (17)
p∗c = p
∗
n + r
∗
c − r∗n +
1
λc
(
e−λcr
∗
c − e−λcr∗n
)
. (18)
This completes the solution to the optimal contract design
for spectrum reservation in IoT systems.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results obtained from an-
alyzing the designed optimal spectrum reservation menu of
contracts for varying system parameters. We first describe
the network setup and the assumed system parameters. We
assume a single monopoly IoT network operator and consider
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Fig. 5: Effect of decreasing average valuation of MC applica-
tions.
the scenario where an access point coordinates the communi-
cation between various IoT devices and the internet. The AP
enforces a reservation based spectrum access system where the
applications can only communicate with the AP in a particular
TF block if they have a prior reservation. Furthermore, the
AP does not know about the nature of the application using
the spectrum. Therefore, it only offers two contracts to the
applications based on prior information about the proportions
of the application types and the distribution of their spectrum
reservation utility.
The system parameters are selected as follows: We assume
that 20% of the applications connected to the AP are MC
and the rest are non-MC, i.e., pic = 0.2 and pin = 0.8 unless
otherwise stated. The time average of the cost of obtaining
an idle channel to the network operator is considered to be
κ = 0.1 monetary units (MU). Unless otherwise stated, we
will use λc = 0.2 MU−1 and λn = 1 MU−1 implying that
the expected utility of the MC applications, i.e., 5 MU, is
higher than the non-MC applications, i.e., 1 MU before the
true utility is learnt. Note that the parameter selection is made
for illustrative purposes and does not affect the generality
of the results. Using the selected parameters, the optimal
amount of rebate offered to the applications is obtained using
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Consequently, the optimal advance
payments can be obtained using results in Corollary 1. The
main observations are described in the sequel.
In Fig. 4, we plot the optimal menu of contracts against
varying proportion of MC applications in the network. It can
be observed that the optimal amount of rebates (shown by
dotted lines) are always lower than the corresponding advance
payments (shown by solid lines). Moreover, that the rebate
to MC applications in the optimal contract is always equal
to the average cost of obtaining a channel, i.e., κ = 0.1.
It is observed that as the proportion of MC applications
increases, the advance payment for MC applications in the
optimal contract reduces while the optimal rebate for MC
applications is fixed at κ. On the other hand, the proportion of
non-MC applications decreases implicitly and this also results
in a decrease in the advance payment and the rebate. Note
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contract.
that as the proportion of MC applications increase to 0.5, i.e.,
the MC and non-MC applications are equally distributed, the
return profit margin (difference between advance payment and
rebate) of the operator becomes equal for both menus.
Fig. 5, investigates the effect of the average utility of the
MC applications prior to contracting on the optimal contracts.
Note that increasing λc implies that the expected utility of the
MC applications decreases. We fix λn = 1 MU−1 and sweep
λc to λc = 0.5. Note that as λc increases, i.e., the expected
utility decreases, the payment and rebate amounts increase in
general to make up for the revenue. Furthermore, the increase
is proportional to the composition of the application types.
Finally, in Fig. 6, we investigate the effect of varying the
average cost of opportunistically obtaining an idle TF block in
the licensed spectrum. It is intuitive that the advance payments
and the rebates for MC applications increase with the increas-
ing cost. However, it is interesting to note that the rebates
increase linearly with the cost while the advance payments
increase non-linearly. As the cost becomes significantly high,
the rebate policy in the optimal dynamic contract effectively
becomes a full refund policy. In other words, the advance
payment becomes high on the agreement that a full refund
will be issued in case of cancellation later. Furthermore,
the advance payments and the rebates designed for non-
MC applications is independent of the cost of obtaining the
channel.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a dynamic mechanism design
framework to establish a spectrum reservation contract for
mission-critical IoT devices in the licensed spectrum using
ultra narrow band technology where time-frequency blocks
can be reserved ahead of time. If the the channel, is not
required later after the initial reservation, the service provider
pays back a part of the reservation payment as a rebate.
We develop optimal dynamic contracts where the applications
learn the reservation utility sequentially over time. The optimal
advanced payments and the rebate amounts are obtained in
closed form that maximize the expected profit of the network
operator. Finally, the behaviour and properties of the contract
terms is analyzed against different system parameters.
In the current work, we have restricted our design and
analysis to use a broad classification of applications, i.e.,
either MC or non-MC types. In practice, there can be several
categories of applications which have different levels of sensi-
tivities to spectrum access delay. Therefore, future extensions
in this direction can further enhance the developed model to
a continuum of application types covering various levels of
mission criticality which may offer higher price discrimination
and consequently higher profitability for the operators.
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